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CONCERNING AFFIDAVITS FOR PUBLICATION
OF
SUMMONS UNDER THE WASHINGTON STATUTE
S ERVICE of process by publication is not a common-law mode of
of procedure, but a statutory creation. The rule, which is almost
universal, that the statutes governing this matter must be strictly
construed, and literally observed to give the court jurisdiction, is adhered
to in this state.'
As a condition precedent to the exercise of the right to serve process
by publication the statute requires the execution of an affidavit by the
plaintiff, his agent or attorney, containing certain allegations. Without
this affidavit a valid service by publication cannot be had.2
While the statute declares "upon filing" of the affidavit publication
of summons may be made, and therefore, appears, under the rule of
strict construction, to make the "filing" of the affidavit an essential
prerequisite, yet the Supreme Court of this state has decided that a
failure to file it until after publication is but an irregularity, "sufficient,
perhaps, to warrant reversal of a judgment in a direct appeal, but
insufficient on a collateral attack to render the judgment void." 3 And
likewise the fact that an affidavit is not filed until some time after its
verification is not material if the defendant is not thereby directly
injured. 4  Injury may arise by reason of the defendant having become
a resident of the state between the time of making the affidavit and its
filing, or by reason of plaintiff, his agent or attorney making the af-
fidavit learning of defendant's address between those dates.5  It is
the execution of a proper affidavit setting forth the requisite facts which
must exist at the time the publication is made that is the material
prerequisite to the right to publish summons.
'Lutkens v. Young, 63 Wash. 4.52, 115 Pac. 1038 (1911) Felainger v. Quinn,
62 Wash. 183, 113 Pac. -75 (1911) Wicki v. Rea, 54 Wash. 424, 103 Pac. 46-
(1909), McManus v. Morgan, 38 Wash. 528, 80 Pac. 186 (1905), DeCorvet v.
Dolan, 7 Wash. 365, 35 Pac.'72 (1893) Boyd v. Superior Court, 6 Wash. 352, 33
Pac. 897 (1893), Rem. Comp. Stat. § -28, P C. § 8441.21Felsger v. Quinn, note 1, supra; Goore v. Goore, 24 Wash. 139, 63 Pac.
1092 (1901), DeCorvet v. Dolan, note 1, supra.
'Tilton v. O'Shea, 31 Wash. 513, 72 Pac. 106 (1903).
'Whitney v. Knowlton, 33 Wash. 319, 74 Pac. 469 (1903).
Whitney v. Knowlton, note 4, supra.
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In order to be effectual, the affidavit must contain a statement of
all the facts specified in the statute,6 which, however, need not be
expressed in the wording of the statute.' The essential facts must
appear in the affidavit itself, as omissions cannot be supplied by reference
to other papers of record,8 so that an affidavit which does not contain
the averments required by the statute is insufficient although the omitted
facts may appear in the complaint.9
Where an affidavit is insufficient to confer jurisdiction, juiisdiction
cannot be conferred by the making and filing of an amended affidavit.
"There are many defects that sometimes affect judgments
that may be cured by amendment; such as the affidavit or
return of service, because jurisdiction is obtained from the
service itself and not from the proof of service. So the affi-
davit of publication of summons, or other errors or defects in
the record, may be cured by amendment when they occur
through the act or omission of the clerk of the court in en-
tering, or in failing to enter, of record, and many other like
matters may be cited in which the right to amend is recog-
nized (citing authority)
"But we know of no instance, where jurisdiction is lacking,
where it is held that jurisdiction may be conferred by amend-
ment."1o
The specific allegations that must be made are:
1. That "the defendant is not a resident of the state or cannot be
found therein."" Since it is intended that a defendant shall be per-
sonally served with process when he is a resident of or within the state,
amenable to process, the importance of this statement is obvious.
2. A statement of the place of residence of the defendant, or, if
unknown, then a positive allegation that it is unknown."2 A number
of errors in wording have been noted by the courts. The most com-
mon error is the allegation that the "postoffice address" of the
defendant is a designated place or is unknown. "Postoffice address"
and "place of residence" are not synonomous, and so cannot be used
interchangeably in affidavits for publication. This particular matter
has not been directly passed upon in Washington. The conclusion
'Burns v. Stolze, 111 Wash. 392, 191 Pac. 642 (1920) Lutkons o. Young,
note 1, supra; Felannger v. Quinn, note 1, supra.
IJesseph v. Carroll, 126 Wash. 661, 219 Pac. 429 (1923).
'Lutkens v. Young, note 1, supra.
'P, elsnger v. Quinn, note 1, supra.
"Lutkens v. Young, note 1, supra.
2 Rem. Comp. Stat. § 228; P C. § 8441.
"See note 11, supra.
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that such an allegation is insufficient is supported by decisions in other
jurisdictions, and, as will be noted, inferentially in this. In North
Dakota where the statute required, like the statute of this state, a
statement of the "place of defendant's residence, if known to the affiant,
and if* not known, stating that fact," the Supreme Court held the aver-
ment that "the last known postoffice address" of the defendant "is
unknown" was insufficient to confer jurisdiction. 8 The fact that a
plaintiff may know the place of defendant's residence and yet be able
to truthfully declare on oath that defendant's last known postoffice
address is unknown to him, is deemed enough in itself to render such
an allegation invalid as a substantial departure from the statute. The
Court declared.
"An examination of the authorities is conclusively against
respondent's contention that the term residence and postoffice
are interchangeable and synonymous, and that the statutory
requirements of a disclosure as to the fact of residence is not
complied with by a showing of fact of last known postoffice
address.
"A glance at many authorities cited under 'residence' in
vol. 7, WORDS AND PHRASES, will disclose that the term
'residence' has a definite legal meaning, i.e. as a place of one's
abode, dwelling-house, or habitation. Conceding that the
term 'address' is synonymous with 'abode' or 'residence,' the
qualification wherein affiant swears to defendant's last known
postoffice address may or may not in fact be a compliance, with
the requirements of the statute that the affidavit shall state
'the place of defendant's residence, if known to the affiant,
and if not known, stating that fact,' according to whether
the postoffice address does or does not properly designate the
place of defendant's residence. For instance, one's residence
may be within one state and his postoffice within another, in
which case, if the postoffice be taken as his residence, an
attachment could not issue or service by publication could not
be had, while if the actual place of defendant's residence be
stated either or both would be available. This is not only
possible, but perhaps frequent as to those domiciled in either
state who reside alongside of or near a boundary line between
the states. We cannot hold a postoffice address to have been
meant or intended to be synonymous with the mandatory
statutory requirement that the place of defendant's residence,
if known, shall be stated, and, if not known, that fact shall
be stated, all as a basis for further proceedings in obtaining
substituted service."
16.Atwood v. Roan, 26 N. D. 622, 145 N. W. 587, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 597
(1014).
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Those who may deem this view too "technical," may profit by
observing what the Court also said in this case:
"If we depart in some particular from the plain statutory
requirement, on a matter concededly jurisdictional, under a
theory, as here advanced, of substantial compliance, not only
is the rule, consonant with all previous decisions on such
jurisdictional questions, disregarded, that such requirements
are to be strictly construed, but there is imparted an element
of uncertainty as to jurisdictional requirements in this and
kindred proceedings in rem, where, if the plain language of
the statute is adhered to as the guide, there can be neither
uncertainty nor ambiguity"
This construction finds support in jurisdictions where the statute
requires that an affidavit shall contain a statement of defendant's "post-
office address," if known, or that it be stated his "postoffice address" is
unknown. Under such a statute an averment that defendant's "resi-
dence" is a designated place or is unknown is held to be insufficient to
confer jurisdiction.14 As observed in one of these cases1" involving the
validity of the allegation that the defendant "is not now, and does
not reside in this state, and that his present place of residence is to
affiant wholly unknown"
"The recital in the affidavit, to the effect that defendant's
place of residence is to affiant wholly unknown may be true
in fact and at the same time his postoffice address be fully
within the knowledge of affiant. In other words, such recital
is in no way equivalent to a statement that defendant's post-
office address is at a certain place, or that such address is
unknown. In actions founded upon constructive service of
summons, the whole policy of the law is to lodge with defend-
ant, if possible, a summons which, on its face, notifies him of
the attack upon his property rights and gives him timely notice
to appear in the court and defend, if he cares to do so. The
law requires a sworn statement from the plaintiff stating the
defendant's postoffice address, or, if not known, to recite
that fact. If an affidavit omitting such statements should be
held sufficient compliance with the statute, then the purpose
of the law, as above suggested, could be easily defeated. It
would enable the plaintiff having knowledge of defendant's
postoffice address to suppress such knowledge, and thus evade
the delivery of summons to defendant-the very thing the
Empire Ranch 8S Cattle Co. v. Saul, 22 Colo. App. 605, 127 Pac. 123 (1913)
11Iillage v. Richards, 52 Colo. 51-2 122 Pac. 788 (191-) Empire Ranch 4. Cattle
Co. v. Gibson, 23 Colo. App. 344, 129 Pac. 520 (1913) Norrs v. Kelsey, 23 Colo.
App. 555, 130 Pac. 1088 (1913) Empzre Ranch t Cattle Co. v. Goodrwk, 923
Colo. App. 385, 128 Pac. 473 (1912).
15 Empire Ranch 8S Cattle Co. v. Saul, note 14, supra.
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statute seeks to accomplish. By the plain language of the sec-
tion quoted, the affidavit for publication must state the post-
office address of defendant or that such address is unknown to
the affiant. The omission of such statement from the affidavit
renders it void, and does not justify an order for publication
of summons based thereon."
In Washington in one case,"6 the plaintiff did not know defendani's
place of residence but did know his postoffice address, and failed to
mail a copy of the summons and complaint thereto. It was argued
that the terms "residence" and "postoffice address" are not synonymous,
and the fact that the plaintiff did know defendant's postoffice address
did not prevent him from making in good faith an affidavit that he did
not know defendant's residence. But the Court held the failure of the
plaintiff to mail a copy of the summons to defendant's postoffice
address was a fraud upon him, voiding the judgment. From this de-
cision one may infer, since the Court did not decide the matter, that it
recognized that residence and postoffice are not synonymous, else it
would have decided that the judgment was void on the ground of in-
sufficiency of the affidavit rather than on the ground of fraud.
Another not uncommon error, is the substitution of the word "where-
about" or "whereabouts" for "place of residence." For example, allega-
tions are often made that defendant is not a resident of this state, etc.,
and his "whereabouts is" (and in some cases, it is said, his "where-
abouts are"), unknown, or that defendant left the state at a designated
date, or a given number of years ago, and his "whereabouts ever since
have been and now are unknown." Such affidavits are wholly in-
effectual. The word "whereabout," or "whereabouts," is not synon-
ymous with "place of residence." This has been decided by the
Supreme Court of North Dakota under a statute similar, as heretofore
shown, to the statute of this state. That court, in considering the
validity of an affidavit which read, 17
"That the defendant is not a resident of the State of North
Dakota, and for that reason it will be impossible to get
personal service on the defendant in the above-entitled action,
that the present whereabouts of this defendant are unknown
to your affiant;"
held that it was insufficient because it contained no statement that
' Noble v. A4no, 50 Wash. 73, 96 Pae. 688 (1908).
2 Kriumenackor v. Andis, 38 N. D. 500, 165 N. W 594 (1917).
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defendant's residence was unknown. Speaking of the word "where-
abouts" used in the affidavit, and of the word "residence" used in the
statute, the Court said.
"These expressions have not the same meaning. It is dear
that a person might be in a place or in many different places at
different times without that place being his residence. Resi-
dence means the place where a person resides or stays with
some degree of permanency. A person may be in a place or
different places, any or all of which may be referred to as
his 'whereabouts,' but none of which is his 'residence.' His
residence may be a great distance from the places we have
referred to. It might be in a different city or a different state,
and a long distance removed from the places which may be
referred to as his 'whereabouts.' The term 'whereabouts
implies a kind of nomadic quality It to some extent im-
plies a wandering from place to place, while on the other
hand 'residence' implies permanency, and brings to our mind
an abiding place for a continuance of time. The word
'whereabouts' having a clearly different significance to the
word 'residence,' it is not synonymous with it, and is not inter-
changeable therewith in use or meaning."
The same Court had under consideration in another case'8 an affidavit
which read.
"That P is not a resident of this state, that prior to the
commencement of this suit the defendant left this state, and
upon information and belief affiant alleges that said defendant
went to Canada, that the wherabouts of the defendant in
Canada are unknown to this affiant or the plaintiffs of whom
affiant has inquired, that the postoffice address of said de-
fendant is unknown to affiant and to the plaintiffs herein."
Holding this affidavit void, the Court declared.
"Affiant might know of the residence or believe the resi-
dence of the defendant to be in an adjoining state, and still
truthfully make the qualified affidavit as to the defendant's
whereabouts."
This affidavit just menti6ned is a fair example of the inexcusable
negligence or incompetency some affidavits expose. Instead of the
simple statutory declaration that the defendant's place of residence
is unknown, there is set out therein two wholly unnecessary and inef-
fectual statements, viz., (1) that defendant's whereabouts are un-
known, (2) that his postoffice address is unknown.
"sJablonskt v. Piesik, 30 N. D. 543, 153 N. W !374 (1915).
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In Illinois, where the statute in force required that the residence of
the defendant, if known, should be stated, or that upon diligent
inquiry it cannot be ascertained, an issue in one case'9 was the suf-
ficiency of an affidavit which read,
"That the defendant formerly resided at the premises lo-
cated at and known as 5559 State street, Chicago, Illinois;
that he has removed from said premises to parts unknown to
the complainant, and, although affiant has made diligent
search and inquiry among the neighbors and acquaintances of
said defendant, he is unable to ascertain his present where-
abouts, and affiant does not know his whereabouts."
Of this affidavit the Court said.
"None of the requirements of the statute are met by the
affidavit filed. It does not appear that upon due inquiry the
defendant could not be found, or that his place of residence
cannot be found upon diligent inquiry. It appears that the
defendant removed from his former place of residence to
parts unknown to the complainant, and that upon diligent
inquiry among his neighbors and acquaintances complainant is
unable to ascertain and does not know his present whereabouts.
But though his whereabouts on May 8, 1902, when this
affidavit was made, may have been unknown, it might be a
matter of no difficulty to ascertain his residence. The affi-
davit is required as to his residence, and not as to his personal
presence. Although he had moved to parts unknown to com-
plainant, and complainant was unable to ascertain his present
whereabouts when he made the affidavit, it might well be,
consistently with the truth of this affidavit, that the defendant
could be readily found and served with process."
There is no excuse for a statement of the statutory requirements
in other terms than those set out in the statute, which are plain.
Other terms, as indicated, may be wholly insufficient, or give rise to
doubt as to their sufficiency and as a result, to doubt as to the
validity of the judgment entered in the cause, which of itself is a
serious matter to parti-s interested. Thus, the allegation that affiant
"is unable to find" defendant's residence has been held a "fair equiva-
lent" to the statement that defendant's place of residence is unknown,
and consequently sufficient.2 But for the decision of this matter by
the'Supreme Court the validity of the proceedings would have remained
doubtful.
'Anderson v. Anderson, 2529 III. 588, 82 N. E. 311 (1917).
'Bardon v. Hughes, 45 Wash. 627, 88 Pac. 1040 (1907).
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3. Unless it be stated in the affidavit that the place of residence
of the defendant is unknown, the allegation must be made that affiant
"has deposited a copy of the summons (substantially in the
form prescribed in section 233 of said codes and statutes) and
complaint in the postoffice, directed to the defendant at his
place of residence." 2'
This requirement must be complied with in order to secure the
right to publish summons and give the court junsdiction. It is only
when defendant's place of residence is unknown, and when that fact
is specifically stated in the affidavit that it is unnecessary to make this
allegation. 2 2 As heretofore stated the "place of residence" and "post-
office address" of a defendant are not necessarily the same-the terms
are not synonymous. It may happen that a plaintiff may not know
defandant's place of residence, and yet know his postoffice address,
and therefore be able to truthfully allege that his place of residence is
unknown. Notwithstanding that the statute does not require affiant
to allege in his affidavit that the postoffice address of the defendant
is a designated place, if known, or that it is unknown, if such be the
fact, (as it does with respect to place of residence), or that a copy of
the summons and complaint has been mailed to defendant's postoffice
address when triat is known and his place of residence is unknown,
yet a failure to do the latter in such a case operates as a fraud upon
the defendant and the court will not acquire jurisdiction of the cause.23
The same result ensues when a copy of the summons and complaint
is mailed, addressed elsewhere than to defendant's residence when
known, or, if not known and his postoffice address is known, then to
the latter.
24
The quoted provision under immediate consideration is an example
of carelessly worded statutes. What is meant by the parenthetical
clause, "substantially in the form prescribed in section 233 of said codes
and statutes"? Must the affidavit contain a statement of the form
of the summons mailed ? Section 233 of what codes and statutes are
referred to? Considering that an affidavit must contain the state-
ments prescribed by the statute to be effectual to give the right to
publish summons and to confer jurisdiction, it is very essential that
this provision be complied with in order to secure a valid judgment,
-' See note 11, supra.
Musselman v. Knottingham, 77 Wash. 435, 137 Pae. 1012 (1914) Lutkoen
v. Young, note 1, supra; Boyd v. Superior Court, note 1, supra.
Noble v. Auno, note 16, supra.
Johnstone v. Peyton, 59 Wash. 436, 110 Pac. 7 (1910).
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and yet, in the face of this fact, the statute has needlessly left uncer-
tain whether a statement of the form of summons mailed is essential
or otherwise. In other words, is the parenthetical clause a mere direc-
tion, an instruction, as to the form of summons which must be mailed,
or more than that, intended as a required statement to be made in
the affidavit?
The act governing service of process by publication of which the
section under consideration. relating to affidavits is a part, was passed
by the legislature at its 1893 session. In this original act the averment
in question was thus set out:
"That he has deposited a copy of the summons and com-
plaint in the postoffice, directed to the defendant at his place
of residence."
This 1893 act, without prescribing forms, provided for three kinds
of summons, viz., (1) one for personal service within the state,
(2) one for personal service without the state; (3) one for publication.
This act did not designate which of these should be mailed to a non-
resident defendant served by publication. There seems to have been
some uncertainty in regard thereto in the minds of lawyers and laymen.
For this reason, it appears, the legislature at its 1915 session amended
section 9 of the act of 1893 (the section governing affidavits for
publication) by an act entitled, "An Act relating to the commence-
ment of civil action in the Superior Courts and amending section 233
of Remington and Ballinger's Annotated Codes and Statutes of Wash-
ington." (ch. 45, p. 146, Sess. L. 1915.) By this amendatory act
said section 9 was changed to read as it now appears in the several
codes. The only changes in said section 9 by this amendatory act
were these: First, to put the words beginning "of which the return
of the sheriff" and ending "is prima facie evidence" in parentheses,
making these words of the original act a parenthetical clause; and,
second, the insertion of the parenthetical clause "(substantially in the
form prescribed in section 233 of said codes and statutes)." This
reference "section 233, .of said codes and statutes" contained in this
amendatory act, is to section 233 of the code referred to in the title
of the act, viz., Remington and Ballinger's Annotated Codes and
Statutes of Washington, which gives the form of summons for pub-
lication prescribed by the Act of 1895. Considering the doubts hereto-
fore mentioned it seems manifest this latter parenthetical clause was
inserted to make that certain which had been uncertain, to point out,
advise, designate and declare what form of summons should be mailed.
Curved lines or brackets are punctuation marks. A parenthetical
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clause is an explanatory or qualifying clause. So this one appears
to be, particularly in view of the fact that the legislature which inserted
this one, by the same act put in parentheses the prior clause mentioned
which had been in the original act without being so inclosed. It seems
clear that the use of parentheses in the first instance to enclose a clause
wholly declaratory indicates the enclosure in parentheses of the latter
clause in the same section was with the same intent. Again, the char-
acter of the language used in the latter clause indicates its character
as declaratory, for an affiant to aver that he has mailed defendant a
copy of the summons "in the form prescribed by section 233 of said
codes and statutes" is not enlightening without designation of the
code so referred to. However, it may be said that it is essential,
jurisdictional, that the form of summons mailed be averred in the
affidavit, because the fact that a proper summons has been mailed in the
case where required is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Since the Supreme
Court may very reasonably hold a statement in the affidavit of the
form of summons mailed, is as essential as the statement of the other
facts the statute requires-that the parenthetical clause is not merely
explanatory and directory-it is certainly wiser and safer to hold that
such a statement is necessary. A designation of the form in the lan-
guage of the statute, or in other words clearly indicating that the proper
form of summons was mailed appears to be sufficient.
The statute under consideration2 5 prescribes the "cases" in which
summons may be published, and, moreover, requires that the affidavit
shall contain a statement of "the existence of one of the cases." This
requirement is mandatory; a statement of the right "case" in the
affidavit being essential to confer jurisdiction.26  The "case" may be
averred in the words of the statute, or the ultimate fact may be set
out substantially in the language of the statute, it being unnecessary
to state the probative facts.
2 7
One of the "cases" specified is, "When the action is for divorce in
the cases prescribed by law "28s Inasmuch as divorces cannot be obtained
except "in the cases," that is to say, for the causes "prescribed by law,"
this "case" could have been expressed better, as, for example, "When
the action is for divorce." The words "in the cases prescribed by law"
I See note 11, supra.
'Burns v. Stolze, 11 Wash. 392, 191 Pae. 642 (1920) Pullman v. Pull-
man, 92 Wash. 120, 158 Pac. 746 (1916), Felnuger v. Quinn, note 1, supra.
:' Mosley v. Donnell, 42 Wash. 518, 85 Pac. 259 (1906) Goore v. Goore, note
2, supra.
21 Rem. Comp. Stat. § 228, subd. 4; P C. § 8441.
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have occasioned uncertainty in the minds of lawyers as to whether the
statement of the "case" in affidavits in suits for divorce in the words
of the statute is sufficient, or whether the words "in the cases prescribed
by law" requires that the cause or grounds for divorce be given, as,
for example, "This is an action for divorce on the grounds of cruel
treatment." It has been the general practise to set forth the cause,
and in Goore v. Goore,29 the Supreme Court appeared to declare such
statement essential. In deciding in that case that it was not necessary
to mention property to the parties to a divorce suit in the affidavit,
the Court said.
"It is enough that the defendant cannot be found within
the state, and that the action is for divorce ino re of the cases
prescribed by law, naming the case."
And again in the same case the Court declared it is the "better prac-
tise" to name the " 'cause prescribed by law,' such as abandonment for
one year, cruel treatment, etc." But this issue has more recently been
directly presented to the Supreme Court and decided by it, though its
dcision as reported gives no clue to that 'fact. The case is that of
Schwarzmniller v. Schwarzmiller 3o In the last paragraph of the opinion
therein, without discussion of the point involved, it is said.
"It is further contended that the summons published in
the divorce case inadequately stated the object of the action.
We are satisfied, however, that it sufficiently answers the
requirement of the statute,-subd. 4, sec. 228, Rem. Code."
(The reference is to the subdivision under consideration.) An exam-
ination of the briefs filed in this suit (which, by the way, is entitled
Schmartzmiller v. Murphy in the briefs), discloses that one of appel-
lant's contentions (page 12 of his brief) was "There was also no suf-
ficient service upon the defendant Murphy because of the inadequacy
of the AFFIDAVIT for PUBLICATION which merely stated that
the object of the action was 'for divorce in cases provided by law'"
Respondent admitted in her brief (page 5) that the affidavit con-
tained as a statement of the ground for divorce, "said action is for
divorce in cases provided by law." So, it will be observed, that there
was no dispute, no contention in regard to what the affidavit contained
as a statement of the "case." What appellant did contend in regard
to the "case" set out in the affidavit was (page 15 of his brief)
-94 Wash. 139, 63 Pac. 1092 (1901).
'* 111 Wash. 62, 191 Pae. 808 (1990).
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"It is further contended by appellant that the affidavit for
publication filed by respondent was not sufficient upon
which to base service by publication in that said affidavit does
not set forth as required by the statute the grounds upon
which the action for divorce is based, but merely says that
that 'said action is for divorce in cases provided by law.'
Manifestly this is not a compliance with the statute authoriz-
ing service by publication."
Respondent made no specific reply in her brief to this objection. In
neither brief was any contention made, as stated by the Supreme Court
in its decision, "that the summons published in the divorce case in-
adequately stated the object of the action." It is manifest that the
Court erred in the last paragraph of its opinion above quoted, and that
what it intended to say was that the statement in the affidavit for
publication in this divorce suit of the "case" in the language "for
divorce in cases provided by law" was sufficient. It, therefore, held
that a statement of such a "case" in the language of subdivision 4 of
the statute in question is valid without mention of the specific grounds
or cause on which the action is based.
Since a presumption of due service arises from recitals thereof in
the judgment, it follows that a judgment is not necessarily void simply
because the affidavit in the record, and upon which publication was
based, is fatally defective.31 But such presumption is only prima
facie, and may be overcome by an affirmative showing that the defec-
tive affidavit was the only affidavit.3 2 Expressed in other words, the
presumption of jurisdiction arising from recitals of due and regular
service of process notwithstanding the only affidavit for service by
publication on file is insufficient, may be overthrown by an affirmative
showing that the only service made was based on that affidavit. The
judgment cannot be attacked by merely pointing out the defective
affidavit.
F C. Hackman.*
SEATTLE, WASH.
'Burns iv. Stoke, note 6, supra.
"Burns v. Stoze, note 6, supra; Lutkena v. Young, note 1, supra.
* Of the Seattle Bar, formerly Associate Editor of LAwYER AND BANKrER,
1921-23.
